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Abstract
We investigate the workforce heterogeneity of startups with respect to ed-
ucation, age and wages. Our explorative study uses data on the population
of 1,614 Danish firms founded in 1998. We track these firms until 2001 which
enables us to analyze changes in workforce composition over time. Such a
dynamic analysis constitutes a hitherto neglected area of entrepreneurship re-
search. To assess relative workforce heterogeneity, we construct a simulated
benchmark to which we compare observed workforce heterogeneity. We find
that the initial workforce is relatively homogeneous compared to our bench-
mark. Our result holds both for non-knowledge-based and, to a lesser extent,
knowledge-based startups. This seems surprising since a vast management
literature advocates heterogeneous teams. The difficulties associated with
workforce heterogeneity (like affective conflict or coordination cost) as well
as “homophily” (peoples inclination to bound with others with similar char-
acteristics) hence appear to generally overweigh the benefits of heterogeneity
(like greater variety in perspectives or more creativity). We also document
that workforces become more heterogeneous over time — startups add work-
ers with skills different from the workforce at startup. The initial supposedly
“poor” mix of workforce characteristics is hence adjusted as the startup ma-
tures. This increase in workforce heterogeneity is, however, smaller compared
to our benchmark but substantially larger than is team additions had the
same characteristics as the initial team members.
JEL-classification: C10, L26, M13.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Startups, Skill Heterogeneity, Team Dynam-
ics.
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Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Eine weitverbreitete Ansicht in der Managementliteratur ist, dass die Mitglieder des
Gru¨ndungsteams eines Unternehmens unterschiedliche Hintergru¨nde haben sollten.
Die Begru¨ndung dafu¨r ist, dass Heterogenita¨t mit einem breiten Spektrum an Per-
spektiven und Kreativita¨t einhergeht, was wiederum zu einer besseren Performance
des Teams und damit des Unternehmens fu¨hrt. Auf der anderen Seite kann Hetero-
genita¨t auch mit Nachteilen wie emotionalen Konflikten oder Koordinationskosten
verbunden sein, die Menschen dazu verleiten, sich homophil zu verhalten, d.h., sich
mit anderen zusammen zu schlieen, die a¨hnliche Charakteristika wie sie selber ha-
ben.
Bestehende Studien, mit denen die Beziehung zwischen Teamheterogenita¨t und der
Performance von jungen Unternehmen analysiert wird, kommen zu sehr unterschied-
lichen Ergebnissen, was den Einfluss von Teamheterogenita¨t auf die Unternehmen-
sperformance betrifft. Diese Studien basieren allerdings oft auf sehr kleinen und
sehr selektiven Stichproben.
In diesem Papier untersuchen wir die Heterogenita¨t der Belegschaft von Gru¨ndun-
gen hinsichtlich Ausbildung, Alter und Lo¨hnen. Die Analysen beruhen auf einem
Datensatz, der alle Unternehmen in Da¨nemark umfasst, die im Jahr 1998 gegru¨ndet
wurden. Wir ko¨nnen die jungen Unternehmen bis zum Jahr 2001 verfolgen, was uns
in die Lage versetzt, auch die Vera¨nderung in der Zusammensetzung der Belegschaft
u¨ber die Zeit zu analysieren. Dies ist ein Aspekt, der bislang aufgrund von Daten-
beschra¨nkungen kaum untersucht werden konnte.
Als methodischen Beitrag simulieren wir die Teamheterogenita¨t in einer Situation
mit zufa¨llig zusammen gesetzten Teams, mit der wir die tatsa¨chlich beobachtete
Heterogenita¨t in der Belegschaft der Gru¨ndungen vergleichen. Unsere Ergebnisse
zeigen, dass die Belegschaft im Gru¨ndungsjahr im Vergleich zur Belegschaft in un-
serer Referenzsituation signifikant homogener ist. Wir ko¨nnen weiterhin feststellen,
dass die Belegschaft u¨ber die Zeit heterogener wird, d.h., in den Gru¨ndungen wer-
den Bescha¨ftigte mit Charakteristika eingestellt, die sich von den Charakteristika
der Belegschaft im Gru¨ndungsjahr unterscheiden. Der vermutlich schlechte Mix
der Charakteristika in der Belegschaft wird also angepasst, wenn die Unternehmen
a¨lter werden. Die Zunahme der Heterogenita¨t ist allerdings geringer als in einer Si-
tuation, in der die jungen Unternehmen neue Bescha¨ftigte nach dem Zufallsprinzip
einstellen wu¨rden. Diese Ergebnisse gelten sowohl fu¨r wissensintensive als auch fu¨r
nicht-wissensintensive Unternehmen, wenngleich die Belegschaft in wissensintensi-
ven Unternehmen etwas heterogener ist als in nicht-wissensintensiven Unternehmen.
Non-Technical Summary
Management scholars predominantly advocate that startup teams should consist of
members with different rather than similar backgrounds. Such heterogeneous team
members are supposed to bring in a greater variety of perspectives and more cre-
ativity which in turn leads to better team performance. There are also, however,
also downsides connected with workforce heterogeneity like affective conflict or co-
ordination cost which may make people “homophile”, i.e. inclined to bound with
others with similar characteristics.
Existing empirical studies have, however, come to quite divergent findings regarding
the relationship between team heterogeneity and firm performance. These studies
are often based on very small and highly selective samples.
We investigate workforce heterogeneity of startups with respect to education, age
and wages using data on the population of Danish firms founded in 1998 which
we follow until 2001. This allows us to also analyze changes in workforce compo-
sition over time, a topic hitherto unexplored in the literature due to binding data
constraints.
As a methodological contribution, we construct a simulated benchmark with ran-
domly matched teams to which we compare the observed workforce heterogeneity.
We find that the initial workforce is relatively homogeneous compared to our bench-
mark situation. We also document that workforces become more heterogeneous over
time - startups add workers with skills different from the workforce at startup. The
initial supposedly “poor” mix of workforce characteristics is hence adjusted as the
startup matures. This increase in workforce heterogeneity is, however, smaller than
in a situation in which startups add new employees randomly. Our results hold both
for knowledge-based non–knowledge-based startups although knowledge–based star-
tups tend to be more heterogeneous in characteristics than non–knowledge–based
startups.
1 Introduction
Management scholars often emphasize the benefits of startup team heterogeneity
for performance. These benefits include the consideration of a greater variety of
options to solve problems (Amason et al. 2006; Beckman et al. 2007; Ensley et
al. 1998; Zimmerman 2008) which should lead to fewer errors in decision making
processes (Roure and Keeley 1990) and more innovation (Bantel and Jackson 1989;
Ruef 2000; Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Østergaard et al. 2011). These advantages
advocated by management theory are, however, not consistently reflected by the
empirical studies (Brouwers et al. 2000; Coad and Timmermans 2012). We review
these studies in Section 2.
Existing empirical work on team heterogeneity often focuses on a very narrowly
defined and heavily selected sets of industries. In addition, the employment dynam-
ics, the type of individuals that are added as team members or that are hired as
employees are not well understood (Horwitz and Horwitz 2007; Ucbasaran et al.
2003). Indeed, Ucbasaran et al. (2003, p. 107) even speak about a “neglected” area
in entrepreneurship research.
The main aims of our exploratory paper are threefold: first, we seek to document
whether or not startup workforces are heterogeneous or homogeneous in terms of
observed characteristics using a very comprehensive data set that tracks all startups
in Denmark in 1998 for a period of three years. We hence provide evidence on
a population of startups as opposed to often heavily selected samples previously
used in the literature.1 Given that we provide evidence for a very broad set of
startups we hope to generate “stylized facts” which may subsequently be found
helpful in informing management theory. Our final data set consists of 1,614 firms
that were founded by teams. We separately consider “knowledge–based” startups
and contrast them with other startups, defining startups as “knowledge–based” if
they belong to a high-technology sector like high–tech manufacturing or technology-
oriented services or, alternatively, if they were co-founded by at least one university
graduate (or both).
Second, we seek to document what types of individuals startups take on board in
the first years of their existence. Parker (2009) proposes a Bayesian learning model
that considers two types of cognitive biases, overoptimism and self-serving attribu-
tions, and that imply that teams tend to be founded by homogeneous founders and
that founders’ choices are state–dependent, i.e. their “poor” (given the positive link
between team heterogeneity and firm performance that many management scholars
1Existing studies consider very high growth firms (Ensley et al. 1998; Kamm et al. 1990),
firms founded by US MBA graduates (Ruef 2000), high technology firms (Clarysse and Moray
2004; Eisenhardt and Bird Schoonhoven 1990; Higgins and Gulati 2003; Roberts 1991; Roure and
Maidique 1986; Shrader and Siegel 2007), firms that eventually went public (Zimmerman 2008),
venture capital backed firms (MacMillan et al. 1985; Zacharakis and Meyer 1998) and university
spin–offs (Forbes et al. 2006; Vanaelst et al. 2006). Ruef et al. (2003) provide a critical discussion
of existing empirical sociological studies of team assembly.
1
suggest) initial team member choices are reinforced or may even become more pro-
nounced over time. Our paper provides empirical regularities on state–dependence
in startup workforce formation.
Third, we offer a methodological innovation to the literature on startup team hetero-
geneity by suggesting a benchmark for heterogeneity. The definition of a benchmark
is important since we would otherwise not be able to discuss if workforces were “het-
erogeneous” or “homogeneous”. Our benchmark allows us to determine degree of
workforce heterogeneity. A natural choice is a random assembly of startup work-
forces among the individuals we observe in our data, which we refer to as “random
matching” hereafter. Our benchmark simulation approach basically comes down to
writing down the names of each startup workforce member in our data on slips of
paper, mixing them up, and throwing them into buckets (where each bucket repre-
sents firms of the original sample in terms of workforce size and sector of economic
activity). The names of the initial startup members in each bucket constitute ran-
domly assembled startup teams, representing the distribution of all possible startup
teams. We subsequently compare the characteristics of those randomly generated
startup teams to the characteristics of the team members we actually observe in
our data. We describe our method more thoroughly in Section 5.2
We also employ a broader and more inclusive definition of team foundations com-
pared to existing studies: startups are team ventures if they are founded by at least
two individuals. We consider both the original founder and her first manager(s) as
well as rank–and–file employees as “founding” members of the startup. The great
majority of new firms start very small which means that workers, founders, and
employees will all have a substantial impact on strategic decisions, a conjecture we
share with Dahl and Klepper (2008), Laursen et al. (2005) as well as Østergaard et
al. (2011) who, like us, are unable to differentiate founders from employees.
A paper close to ours in terms of methodology and content is Ruef et al. (2003) who
focus on the actual combination of team members in terms of gender and ethnic-
ity (e.g. male/male, male/male/female, female/female, female/female/male etc.).
They find that homophily – “the tendency of agents to associate disproportionately
with those having similar traits” (Golub and Jackson 2012, p. 1287) – and network
constraints – the presence of prior ties to team members like family membership –,
are the main determinants of team assembly. Ruef et al.’s (2003) benchmark is the
unconditional theoretical probability that a team with a particular composition is
observed. They base their probability calculations on a Poisson distribution. The
main methodological difference to our approach is that ours does not involve the
prediction of any probabilities and that we therefore do not need to make any dis-
tributional assumptions – our approach is non–parametric. We hence do not risk
2Our methodology is best compared to Ellison and Glaeser’s (1997) “dartboard approach” of
geographic industry concentration. Their thought experiment is to write down the identity of each
firm in their data on a dart and to throw these darts on a map of the US, thereby generating
a random distribution of firms across the US which they compare to the actual and observed
distribution of firms.
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biased simulation results caused by a potential mis-specification of the underlying
probability distribution. In terms of content, we differ from Ruef et al. (2003)
by studying workforce heterogeneity across technology–based and non technology–
based firms while they do not distinguish different types of startups. They also do
not analyze the development of startup workforce heterogeneity over time.3
Teams may be heterogeneous in various dimensions. We characterize startup work-
forces by an “ascribed” (Forbes et al. 2006) characteristic, namely age, and an
“achieved” characteristic, namely education. We choose these two characteristics
since they received considerable attention in the literature. We also introduce a
hitherto unexplored measure of heterogeneity to the team diversity literature – dif-
ferences in wages workforce members received prior to joining the startup. This
measure condenses a wide range of ascribed and achieved characteristics of indi-
viduals like labor market experience, gender, education or tenure that individuals
possess in a single variable (Heckman et al. 2003; Mincer 1958).
Our main findings are that (i) the workforce of startups is systematically assembled
and that (ii) startup workforce members are systematically added as the business
ages. Moreover, we show that (iii) startup workforces are statistically significantly
less heterogeneous than under our simulated benchmark. We also show that (iv)
startup workforces with university graduates tend to be somewhat more heteroge-
neous compared to startup workforces without university graduates while there is no
difference between startup workforces from knowledge–based and non–knowledge–
based sectors, and that (v) startup workforces become statistically significantly
more heterogeneous in terms of member characteristics over time. They do, how-
ever, (vi) become less heterogeneous than if members were randomly added but be-
come substantially more heterogeneous than if founding workforce members hired
people with skills identical to their own. Finally, (vii) startups from knowledge–
based sectors become more heterogeneous over time compared to startups from
other sectors while startups that involve university graduates become less hetero-
geneous relative to startups that did not involve university graduates. We discuss
this discrepancy in Subsection 6.2.
Given that management theory tends to advocate team heterogeneity as beneficial
to firm performance, our finding of comparatively little team heterogeneity may
seem surprising. Our results indicate that the gloomy side of team heterogeneity
such as increased communication costs and conflict may compensate the associated
advantages in reality. Another related explanation of our findings is homophily.
Social scientists explain homophily with the lack of access to individuals with char-
acteristics different from their own (Aldrich and Kim 2007; Byrne 1971; Coleman
1988; Ruef et al. 2003) while Parker (2009) identifies cognitive biases in founders’
belief as the key source of homophily.
Management theory that concerns itself with startup team assembly would there-
3In addition, Ruef et al. (2003) base their analysis on data on “nascent” entrepreneurship while
we consider actual startups.
3
fore probably benefit from being integrated with theories of homophily rooted in
sociology in order to become aligned with the empirical regularities we find in our
representative data set. We hope to provide a solid empirical fundament for such
theoretical endeavors.
The paper is organized as follows: We first review the existing management litera-
ture on team heterogeneity and team dynamics in Section 2. We describe our data
in Section 3, define our measures of heterogeneity in Section 4, explain our “ran-
dom matching” approach in Section 5 and discuss our empirical results in Section
6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Existing studies
In this section, we review the existing body of literature related to the (i) hetero-
geneity of teams with respect to education, age and prior wages and (ii) changes
in team heterogeneity as startups mature. We first discuss team heterogeneity in
general terms before turning to the specific team heterogeneity measures we adopt.
2.1 Affective and cognitive conflict
The main issue in the context of team heterogeneity discussed in the management
literature is conflict. Conflict is seen both as a promoter of creativity and as a source
for animosity and resentment (Ensley et al. 2002). It is more likely to occur if values
and personal backgrounds of the acting individuals are different (Jehn 1994) and
if joint social interaction norms are lacking (Amason and Sapienza 1997). Such
interaction norms may be more different the more heterogenous the characteristics
of the team members are.
The literature distinguishes between “cognitive conflict”, the “sharing and develop-
ing of ideas through cognitive tug and pull” (Ensley and Pearce 2001 p. 146) which
is “stimulated when top managers scrutinize one another’s perspectives in an effort
to extract and combine the best elements of each” (Amason and Schweiger 1994, p.
246) and “affective conflict” which is more emotive in nature and which is shown
to harm the establishment of strategic consensus (Knight et al. 1999).
Cognitive conflict promotes organizational success (Amason and Sapienza 1997;
Bunderson and Sutcliffe 2002; Hambrick et al. 1996; Hambrick and Mason 1984,
Kilduff et al. 2000) as it avoids group think, induces people to reconsider their
suggestions, generates a variety of perspectives (Miller et al. 1998; Simons et al.
1999), and leads to more creativity (Ensley et al. 2002; Smith et al. 1994).
Affective conflict is demonstrated to have negative consequences for organizational
success. It is detrimental to strategic decision making and blocks strategic change
(Knight et al. 1999; Lant et al. 1992; Wiersema and Bantel 1992).
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One can, however, not stimulate cognitive conflict without simultaneously increasing
affective conflict since they constitute the two sides of the same coin or, as Amason
and Schweiger (1994, p. 246) phrase it, “cognitive conflict inadvertently produces
affective conflict”. Prior research has documented that the two types of conflict
indeed often occur simultaneously (Baron 1988; Brehmer 1976; Cosier and Rose
1977; Ensley et al. 2002; Pelled 1996; Pelled et al. 1999; Tjosvold 1985) and that
there are significant links between them (Amason 1996; Jehn 1995, 1997).
While management theory has not come to a unique verdict with regards to the
mapping between team heterogeneity and firm performance, a comprehensive review
and meta–analysis of the related empirical literature by Brouwers et al. (2000)
shows that team heterogeneity does not have clear-cut effects on performance but
that team heterogeneity appears to further performance for high–difficulty tasks. By
contrast, heterogeneity does not matter for low–difficulty tasks. We hence speculate
that team heterogeneity is larger in knowledge–based startups, as there are likely
to be more high–difficulty than low–difficulty tasks to be performed, than in other
startups. This essentially is the only hypothesis we are able to formulate given the
contradictory results generated by existing empirical studies on team heterogeneity
reviewed below.
Subsection 2.2 surveys existing empirical studies that investigate age and education
heterogeneity in teams. It also discusses our new heterogeneity measure, wages.
Subsection 6.2 reviews the existing literature on the dynamics of heterogeneity in
teams.
2.2 Heterogeneity in education, age and prior wages
2.2.1 Research on educational heterogeneity and firm performance
Starting with existing studies dealing with heterogeneity in education and firm
performance, Bantel (1993) claims that educational heterogeneity adds variety in
perspectives, Wiersema and Bantel (1992) relate educational heterogeneity to di-
versity in cognitive perspectives and Tihany et al. (2000) find that educationally
more diverse teams are better equipped to handle complex decision making situ-
ations for their sample of 126 US electronics industry firms. Zimmerman (2008)
shows that diversity in terms of education significantly increases capital raised at
IPO for a sample of 243 US software firms. Likewise, Amason et al. (2006) find
that educational heterogeneity of startup teams is weakly positively related to firm
performance in their sample of 174 “high potential” new ventures.
An influential study by Roure and Keeley (1990) analyzes the mapping between
team heterogeneity in terms of prior experience and firm performance using a sample
of 36 “high potential” new ventures, finding weak evidence for positive effects of
that type of heterogeneity on financial performance. Beckman et al. (2007) come to
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similar conclusions for their sample of 161 Silicon Valley high technology startups
and their success measure Initial Public Offering.
Coad and Timmermans (2012), who basically use the same data set as we do, study
the relationship of alternative combinations of founding team member characteris-
tics on the employment growth and survival of dyad (two–person) teams. They find
that differences in age between the two team members improve startup performance.
These positive findings do contrast, however, with Ensley et al. (1998) who docu-
ment negative effects of educational team heterogeneity on firm performance for a
sample 88 fast growing US firms. Ensley et al. (2001) come to a similar conclusion
for 70 Inc. 500 firms. They speculate that affective conflict frequently dominates
cognitive conflict.
Most studies hence indicate that there exists a positive, albeit often statistically
insignificant relationship between team heterogeneity.
It seems plausible to observe more heterogeneity in education for knowledge–based
startups since cognitive conflict appears to be more important for such firms to
solve problems that arise in the R&D process as well as in production and distri-
bution of the final product. Cognitive conflict is more likely to dominate affective
conflict in such a setting. Indeed, Bantel and Jackson (1989) show that educational
heterogeneity is positively related to innovation in the banking sector. In a similar
vein, Østergaard et al. (2011) use survey data for incumbent firms combined with
Danish register data similar to ours to document a positive relationship between
educational diversity and innovative performance.
2.2.2 Research on age heterogeneity and firm performance
Richard and Shelor (2002) use differences in team age as a proxy for differences in
perspectives, belief systems and social networks which should all improve organiza-
tional performance. The intuition here is similar to Williams and O’Reilly (1998)
who argue that age heterogeneity provides better access to sets of information and
perspectives which enhances group decision making. The potential that these types
of cognitive conflict entail is, however, countered by an increase in affective conflict
since differences in age make communication and social integration more difficult.
Kilduff et al. (2000), Richard and Shelor (2002) as well as Wiersema and Bantel
(1992) find a positive correlation between age heterogeneity in teams and firm per-
formance. Bantel (1993) does, however, find only little empirical support for age
heterogeneity being positively related to strategic clarity and thus firm performance.
Coad and Timmermans (2012) provide evidence for a positive relationship between
age differences among team members and firm performance.
Age heterogeneity may be more important for knowledge–based startups since
younger managers are associated with trying the new and risky (Boeker, 1988;
Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and since they are also
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better equipped to understand recent innovations as well as the associated opportu-
nities and threats (Boeker 1988). At the same time, pulling off a new–technology–
startup may require a substantial amount of industry experience (Shane and Stuart
2002). Combining both young and old workers, hence may improve firm perfor-
mance in particular for knowledge–based firms, a claim that is empirically substan-
tiated by Bantel and Jackson (1989). With these pieces of evidence and the results
by Brouwers et al. (2000) in mind we expect team heterogeneity to increase more
in knowledge–based startups than in other firm foundations.
2.2.3 Previous wages
Formal education and age only capture a fraction of the set of skills that determine
an individuals’ ability that is relevant for firm performance. Ever since Mincer
(1958), researchers have related wages to observed worker characteristics like edu-
cation and age – that we study separately – but also to other variables like tenure,
labor market experience, gender, sector of employment etc. Wages hence combine
a wealth of information and thus constitute a heterogeneity measure that takes
into account the multi–dimensionality of worker characteristics. Moreover, when
regressing observed worker characteristics on observed wages, a large fraction of the
observed wages remains unexplained (Heckman et al. 2003). This fraction relates
to unobserved characteristics of the workers which implies that considering wages
as a team member demographic also accounts for skills that otherwise would go
unnoticed.
Previous wages, or rather their standard deviation across team members, have not
yet been used to measure team heterogeneity in startups before. Following the
arguments in the beginning of this section, greater heterogeneity in prior wages will,
however, increase both cognitive and affective conflict since they reflect differences
in characteristics of team members. Affective conflict associated with differences in
prior wages hence appears to dominates cognitive conflict which leads us to expect
to observe that actual team heterogeneity is larger than our benchmark.
2.3 The dynamics of founding teams
The preceding paragraphs all dealt with founder heterogeneity at startup. However,
startups evolve over time and may change team members and workforce. Our anal-
ysis to follow takes a “dynamic team perspective” (Vanaelst et al. 2006) that we
subsequently take to the data. We find this issue particularly important since ex-
isting studies have underscored the importance of team additions on organizational
performance (Forbes et al. 2006) but have not analyzed dynamic teams beyond
case studies.
In work most closely related to our analysis, Vanaelst et al. (2006) analyze ten
university spin-outs and find that new team members tend to have a background
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different from the background of the initial team members, i.e. team heterogeneity
increases over time.
In other related work on team development over time Dahl and Klepper (2008) show
that firms that later turn out to be successful consistently pay higher wages from the
beginning, thereby attracting the most capable workers. This hiring policy leads to
what Dahl and Klepper term “enduring firm capabilities” (p. 26). However, they do
not make statements regarding team heterogeneity and its development over time.
Forbes (2005) describes adding team members as a process where resource–seeking
aspects and interpersonal attraction are important. Interpersonal attraction is likely
to dampen affective conflict while the resource–seeking aspect relates to comple-
mentary skills and knowledge that a new team member brings about. Any lack of
complementary skills may become more apparent to the initial founding team as
their startup gets closer to market and as it grows.
This is in contrast to Parker’s (2009) theoretical model of Bayesian learning where
cognitive biases prevents team members from adding new members with different
skills. Teams therefore become more homogeneous as they grow older.
An alternative and more menial explanation for a possibly decreasing team hetero-
geneity may simply be that work becomes more routinized as startups become older
so that cognitive conflict may no longer be of particular importance.
It appears to be difficult to a priori assess whether we should expect to observe
stronger or weaker changes in team heterogeneity for knowledge–based startups.
Knowledge–based startups may need to be founded by heterogeneous teams as the
product or service as well as its marketing and logistics may need complementary
skills (Colombo and Piva 2012). On the one hand, these startups may therefore be
more heterogeneous right from the start and may not need to add further team mem-
bers with characteristics different from the characteristics of the initial founders. On
the other hand, these firms may need to learn about the complexity of their product
or service over time and they may later realize gaps in their skills portfolio.
3 Data
While existing studies, in particular the stack of case studies, often can go into great
depth, they are unable to make generalizable statements. This makes Vanaelst et
al. (2006, p. 268) close their paper by writing that there “would appear to be scope
for more large-scale testing of the insights generated in this article”.
The data set we use does not only differ from existing studies in terms of size. It
is also different in terms of representativity – our data constitute a population, all
startups in a given year, while existing studies are based on samples.
8
The data is provided to us by Statistics Denmark, Denmark’s federal statistical
office. It constitutes register data and covers the whole population of firms set up
in Denmark in 1998. These firms are tracked until the end of 2001.
We link the information on startups with an employee–level data set, the so–called
“IDA” data, that contains information about the characteristics of the founders
and the employees working in the startup. IDA, previously used i.a. by Bingley and
Westergaard–Nielsen (2003), Dahl and Sorenson (forthcoming) as well as Dahl and
Klepper (2008), covers a wide range of variables on the total Danish population from
1980 onwards. The time series dimension of the data allows us to track founders
and employees over time. Timmermans (2010c) provides an excellent review of the
IDA data.
Our full data set contains information on 14,171 startups, the founder(s) and the
employees working in these startups. Following Timmermans (2010a, 2010b), we
verify that our startups are actual startups by checking whether the corresponding
firm identifiers existed in previous years. More importantly, we also discard firms
for which we were able to find corresponding plant identifiers in previous years. We
identify a total of 1,614 team foundations. These figures suggest that Gartner et
al.’s (1994) claim that “the management of new ventures generally constitutes a
shared effort” may actually not hold for more representative data sets as ours.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of our data set. It differentiates between
startups that are knowledge–based and those that are not. We use four defini-
tions for knowledge–based startups. The first is based on the startups’ industrial
classification. To define sectors of economic activity as knowledge–based we use a
definition developed by the Centre for European Economic Research. According to
this definition all sectors in which R&D, new knowledge and human capital play an
important role are considered as knowledge–based. The Appendix provides a sum-
mary of our classification. Our second definition is that firms are knowledge–based
if at least one founder holds a university degree. Third, we narrow this definition
down by focusing on university graduates from a “relevant field”, i.e. from tech-
nical or natural sciences, veterinary or agricultural sciences, and health sciences
(except general practitioners and hospitals), following Kaiser et al. (2011). Since
even graduates with a university degree in a relevant field may found a restaurant
instead of a knowledge–based, high growth startup we finally, and similar to Tim-
mermans (2010b), consider foundations of university graduates and in sectors that
we identified as knowledge–based.4
Table 1 shows that team foundations constitute a small minority across all sectors
and type of startup. Startups from consumer–oriented services and the construction
sector are most often founded by teams. The respective share of team startups is
18 percent here. The lowest fraction of team foundations is in knowledge–intensive
4Restricting attention to university graduates in relevant fields and in sectors that we identified
as knowledge–based did lead to a substantial decrease in the number of teams which is why we
discard a separate analysis.
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services (excluding non–technical consulting services). These differences in the share
of team foundations may be due to differences in labor intensity and entry costs.
There are no systematic differences between startups from knowledge–based and
non knowledge–based sectors. Startups with university graduates and startups from
knowledge–based sectors are at least, however, as often founded by teams as the
average startup. Regarding the number of team members, we find that knowledge–
based startups tend to be founded by more team members than the average startup.
4 Measurement
Our study involves various measurement issues that are related to the definition of
our main heterogeneity variables that we discuss in the following.
Age and previous wages are continuous variables. To measure team heterogeneity we
use the respective standard deviations across the team members, following Ensley
and Pearce (1990).
For the categorial variable education a calculation of standard deviations is not
meaningful which is why we, consistent with Clarysse and Moray (2001), Teachman
(1980) Ucbasaran et al. (2003), Vanaelst et al. (2006) as well as Wiersema and
Bantel (1992), use the Blau-index instead. The Blau-index is calculated as one
minus the sum of the squared shares of team members with education k, sk: B = 1−∑n
k=1 s
2
k, where the summation over the squared shares constitutes the Hirschman-
Herfindahl concentration index that is frequently used in Industrial Organization
and n defines the number of team members. The more homogeneous teams are,
the closer the Blau-index gets to 1/n and it approaches 1 the more heterogeneous
teams are.
An important measurement issue relates to the values of the Blau-index being de-
pendent on the number of individuals in the team. For two team members, the
index either takes on the values one or 12 . For three team members the set of pos-
sible values is 1, 59 and
1
3 . To correct for team size, we scale the Blau index as
follows:
Btr =
n
n− 1(1−
n∑
k=1
s2k) ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
The transformed Blau-index takes on the value zero if all team members have the
same education and is one if each individual attained a different education.
5 Random matching
Blau-indices and standard deviations do not per se provide much information about
the degree of heterogeneity in the teams. The reason is that there is no natural ref-
erence level providing a basis to decide whether a particular value of the measures
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means that the heterogeneity is low, high, or average. We therefore construct a
reference by using simulation methods. We test whether the observed degrees of
heterogeneity are statistically significantly different from the degree of heterogeneity
in a situation where teams are randomly assembled. Thus, our benchmark is a sit-
uation where founders do not systematically look for teammates. This allows us to
gather information about both whether the search for teammates occurs systemati-
cally and in which direction the search is carried out (similar/more homogeneous or
dissimilar/more heterogeneous). If individuals systematically look for team mates,
the observed team heterogeneity is statistically significantly different from the ran-
domly generated team heterogeneity. If the observed heterogeneity is statistically
significantly larger than the simulated heterogeneity, teams systematically add in-
dividuals who are are different from themselves.
To generate a random distribution of team characteristics we first select all indi-
viduals of a given sector and randomly assign them to firms, thereby maintaining
the actually observed team size of firms. Thus, we generate sector–specific and
team size–specific random teams. We subsequently calculate our measures of team
heterogeneity, average them to the sector and team size level and store the cor-
responding heterogeneity measures. This procedure is carried out 1,000 times in
total which generates a random distribution of team heterogeneity. We term this
benchmark “random matching” and compare it to the actual distribution of team
heterogeneity we observe in our data.
To analyze the dynamics of team heterogeneity we compare teams before and after
individuals joined or left a startup. We calculate the differences in heterogeneity
before and after the team composition changed. We also compare it to an identical
situation where team members are added or subtracted in a sector–specific and
team size–specific random way.
The random assignment of new team members to firms mimics a situation where
firms do not at all search systematically for individuals and hence constitutes an
extreme case. At the other extreme, firms may systematically search for teammates
but focus on individuals which are identical to themselves, i.e. they try “cloning”
themselves with respect to education, age or wages. We consider this situation of
“random cloning” as a second benchmark that we also compare to the changes in
team heterogeneity we observe in our data.
6 Results
Our results fall into two parts. The first relates to team heterogeneity at startup
while the second is concerned with the dynamics of team heterogeneity.
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6.1 Team heterogeneity at startup
Table 2 displays actual observed and simulated team heterogeneities at startup.
It differentiates between knowledge–based and non–knowledge–based startups as
discussed in Section 3.
Table 2 shows that team founders both systematically look for team members – the
observed team heterogeneity is statistically significantly different compared to the
benchmark – and that team heterogeneity is statistically significantly lower than
if teams were randomly assembled. This is at odds with management theory that
advocates team heterogeneity.
The quantitative differences between actual heterogeneity and our benchmark are
most substantial for team age where actual and simulated standard deviations differ
by as much as 28.2 percent. It is less pronounced for education and wages the
difference is around twelve percent.
Knowledge–based manufacturing startups are unsurprisingly among the most het-
erogeneous in terms of education, wages and age which is fully consistent with our
prior put forward in Subsection 2.1. This is partly also true for startups that involve
university graduates where, however, age heterogeneity is fairly low. We speculate
that this observation may be explained by cohorts of university graduates founding
a startup, probably after the idea behind the new firm was incepted at university.
In fact, for university graduates in relevant fields we actually find no differences in
terms of wages between observed and random team assembly.
Startups from construction are among the firms with the lowest heterogeneity in
general. This results coincides very well with the meta–analysis provided by Brouw-
ers et al. (2000).
In Table 3 we show the results of tests that directly contrast the degree of hetero-
geneity between knowledgebased and non-knowledgebased start-ups. One problem
in such analyzes is that the distribution of the measures of heterogeneity under the
null hypothesis can only be analytically derived for a given team size.5 We therefore
separately consider firms with two team members (upper part of Table 3) and for
firms with more than three team members (lower part of Table 3).6
While Table 3 generally shows that knowledge–based startups are more hetero-
geneous than non-knowledge–based startups, these differences are statistically in-
significant in most cases. There are a few exceptions: for two-person-teams we find
statistically significantly differences in the degree of heterogeneity with respect to
wages between startups with and without university graduates. For three-person-
teams we tend to find more heterogeneity in terms of education for knowledge–based
5This is another reason why we apply simulation methods to evaluate the degree of heterogene-
ity.
6By applying simple t-tests we treat the measures of heterogeneity as continuous variables
implying that we assume the test statistics follow t-distribution under the null hypothesis.
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startups. However, for the heterogeneity with respect to age we find a significantly
lower degree of heterogeneity in knowledge–based startups in three-person teams.
We hence find very little evidence for actual team heterogeneity being larger than
under our benchmark. We do, however, find weak support for our hypothesis that
knowledge–based startups employ a more heterogeneous workforce than startups
that are not knowledge–based.
6.2 The dynamics of team heterogeneity
Table 4 displays changes in workforce heterogeneity before and after a new work-
force member was added. The key finding of that table is that team heterogeneity
increases over time. Compared to team heterogeneity before new team members
joined the firm all heterogeneity measures we consider increase by around 50 percent.
Note that this is not an artifact caused by the fact that some startups may have
grown considerably after foundation. This is so since our benchmark indeed com-
pares apples and apples, namely teams that add/substract the exact same amount
of team members.7
How do these observed changes compare to our two hypothetical situations where
additional team members are randomly matched (column “With random assign-
ment”) or where they constitute clones of the existing team members (“With ran-
dom cloning”)? The table shows that the observed changes in team heterogeneity
are substantially and statistically significantly larger than under the hypothetical
situation of random cloning. The observed changes are, however, statistically sig-
nificantly smaller than if team members were randomly added. This means that
individuals actually look for other individuals with characteristics different from
their own, but compared to a situation of random assignment they tend to system-
atically choose additions with similar characteristics.
We again find quite substantial relative differences between startups from knowledge–
based and non knowledge–based sectors. Startups in knowledge–based sectors are
among those where heterogeneity increases the most, with knowledge–based service
firms being the main drivers behind this pattern. Other business related services
constitutes an exception from this rule.
While we document that team heterogeneity among startups in knowledge–based
sectors has increased more than among non–knowledge–based startups, we come to
a somewhat different conclusion for startups with and without university graduates.
In both startups types team heterogeneity substantially increases. However, this
increase is considerably smaller for startups that involve university graduates which
seems to contrasts with our result that startups from knowledge–based sectors in-
crease team heterogeneity more than startups from other sectors. This is also true
7In addition, even if our benchmark did not take differences in net team additions into account,
our figures would still be meaningful since these additions could both increase or decrease team
heterogeneity.
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for startups that involve university graduates from relevant fields in knowledge–
intensive sectors. Colombo and Piva (2012) provide a theoretical explanation for
our finding. Their graphical model predicts that academic technology–based star-
tups rather add team members with technical than with commercial skills compared
to academic non-technology–based startups. This in turn implies that heterogeneity
in education increases to a lesser degree for academic compared to non–academic
startups, an implication that both our study and Colombo and Piva’s (2012) own
empirical analysis on Italian technology–based startups support.
The absolute differences between knowledge–based and non–knowledge–based firms
along with tests for statistical significance of those differences are shown in Table
5. These tests are based on observed changes and indicate that the differences
between knowledge–based sector firms and other firms are also statistically highly
significant for education and wages. Differences in age heterogeneity are statistically
insignificant. The table also shows that the differences in changes in observed
heterogeneity are statistically significant for all heterogeneity measures for startups
with university graduates.
7 Conclusions and implications
Existing management theory advocates that startups are to be founded by individ-
uals with heterogeneous skills, arguing that varieties in perspectives enable teams to
take decisions that foster startup performance. However, team heterogeneity may
go along with “affective conflict”, i.e. destructive conflict, that may arise because
individuals who need to reach a joint decision have different characteristics. These
negative effects may lead founders to associate with individuals of similar character-
istics rather than with individuals with individuals of different characteristics which
leads to team “homophily” rather than team heterogeneity.
While existing studies of team heterogeneity are generally based on highly selective
samples, we provide evidence for an entire population of startups. We identify 1,614
team foundations across all sectors in Denmark in 1998. We trace those startups
until 2001 which enables us to team dynamics as well. We use education, age and
previous wages as indicators of team heterogeneity. Our use of previous wages is
novel. It combines a wealth of information on an individual’s characteristics like
education, experience or tenure in a single measure.
In order to be able to assess if team heterogeneity is large or small we compare
observed team heterogeneity to a benchmark which is the random distribution of
possible team assemblies based on characteristics of the team members.
We find that observed heterogeneity differs statistically significantly from the het-
erogeneity we generate in our benchmark situation. This means that founders sys-
tematically look for fellow team members. They do, however, tend to look for indi-
viduals who have similar characteristics as themselves – the degree of heterogeneity
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is statistically significantly smaller compared to our benchmark. These first two
findings hold for both knowledge–based and non–knowledge–based startups. How-
ever, knowledge–based startups tend to be more heterogeneous in characteristics
than other startups.
The findings contrast with management theory’s view that more team heterogeneity
is better – if that indeed was the case, we should observe more heterogeneity in our
data.
Our results are, however, consistent with Parker’s (2009) learning model where ho-
mogeneous founders bound together because they are overoptimistic and possess
self–serving attributes – individuals sharing similar beliefs are taken on board since
founders believe that they thereby improve firm performance, a cognitive bias that
is reinforced by self–serving attributes. Parker (2009) also finds that “informed
outsiders” may have a positive impact on founders’ decision to establish a hetero-
geneous venture team, thereby improving the startups’ future performance.
Another explanation for our finding of relative homogeneity may be found in social
network theory which identifies limited access to co–founders as the main source of
homogeneity (Aldrich and Kim 2007; Coleman 1988; Ruef et al. 2003).
The model proposed by Parker (2009) also predicts that homogeneity is state–
dependent: founders do not learn from their initial allegedly suboptimal startup
team composition. They update information regarding firm performance in a self–
serving manner and add team members in a way that generates ever more homo-
geneous teams. Our empirical findings do not subscribe to this model prediction
as our data suggest that while team heterogeneity initially is comparatively low,
we do observe a fairly substantial increase in team heterogeneity over time. Team
heterogeneity in terms of education, previous wages and age increases by around
50 percent. It does, however, increase statistically significantly less than if team
members were randomly added. At the same team, team heterogeneity increases
substantially (and statistically significantly) more compared to a situation where
added team members had exactly the same characteristics as the initial founding
team members. Thus, founders both systematically add team members and add
individuals that possess somewhat different characteristics than themselves. They
hence appear to indeed learn from their initially – and according to management
theory – “poor” team composition.
While team heterogeneity increases in all types of startups over time we find that
in startups from knowledge–based sectors, like knowledge–based manufacturing or
technology-intensive services, team heterogeneity increases statistically significantly
more than in startups from non–knowledge–intensive sectors. We come to opposite
conclusions for startups that involve university graduates, even if they start a firm
in a knowledge–intensive sector. This is consistent with Colombo and Piva (2012)
whose model predicts that these types of startups rather add team members with
technical than with commercial skills.
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Our paper shows that teams are founded by individuals with comparatively similar
observable characteristics. Possible explanations for our results are put forward
by cognitive biases affecting team selection and by network theory. It remains
to be unresolved which theory more accurately predicts the empirical regularities
we find in our large and representative data set. If it is indeed network theory,
the inability of individuals to find partners with different characteristics this would
provide scope for “entrepreneurial matching markets” where potential entrepreneurs
with different skills would, for example, be brought together at startups camps
organized by universities or government agencies.
Integrating existing management theory on team heterogeneity with network theory,
which is rooted in sociology, and theories of cognitive bias, would probably generate
theoretical evidence that may be able to explain the empirical regularities we find.
We hope that our paper constitutes an empirically firm foundation for such theory
building.
The present paper sought to generate stylized facts on team heterogeneity and
the dynamics of team heterogeneity. Studying the performance effects of team
heterogeneity using a representative data set like ours appears as an attractive
subject of future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Number Share Average
of firms of teams team size
(in %) in startup
year
All firms 14,608 11.4 4.3
Firms in knowledge–intensive sectors
High-tech manufacturing 137 14.6 5.6
Technology-intensive services 1,881 5.2 3.6
Knowledge–intensive services 946 5.5 3.9
Firms in non–knowledge–intensive sectors
Non-high-tech manufacturing 754 14.7 6.4
Other business oriented services 2,167 6.1 4.6
Consumer-oriented services 2,579 17.8 4.5
Construction 1,720 18.4 4.0
Wholesale and retail trade 4,424 10.7 3.8
Firms with university graduates 2,569 11.7 5.5
Firms w/o university graduates 11,495 10.6 3.8
Firms w/ university graduates in relevant fields 957 13.6 6.2
Firms w/o university graduates in relevant fields 13,097 10.5 4.0
Firms w/ university graduates in knowledge–intensive sectors 1,157 9.0 4.4
Firms w/o university graduates in knowledge–intensive sectors1 12,907 10.9 4.2
Table 1 displays basic descriptive statistics of our data. 1Differences in the total number of firms are due
to missing information in the education variable.
Table 2: Heterogeneity in startup year
Education Age Wages
Observed With
random
assignm.
Observed With
random
assignm.
Observed With
random
assignm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All team startups 0.855 0.953*** 8.409 10.167*** 0.273 0.309***
Firms in knowledge–intensive sectors 0.861 0.961*** 7.838 9.377*** 0.281 0.312***
High-tech manufacturing 0.905 0.964* 10.628 11.298 0.303 0.380***
Technology-oriented services 0.859 0.974*** 7.091 8.086*** 0.270 0.291
Knowledge–intensive services 0.849 0.936*** 8.174 11.072*** 0.294 0.326*
Firms in non-knowledge–intensive sectors 0.855 0.952*** 8.475 10.258*** 0.272 0.309***
Non-high-tech manufacturing 0.874 0.946*** 9.607 11.961*** 0.275 0.313***
Other business oriented services 0.921 0.965*** 8.495 9.800*** 0.309 0.336**
Consumer-oriented services 0.860 0.949*** 8.235 9.954*** 0.277 0.331***
Construction 0.771 0.939*** 8.194 9.971*** 0.235 0.278***
Trade 0.883 0.960*** 8.624 10.475*** 0.280 0.301***
W/ univ. grad. 0.912 0.975*** 8.072 10.477*** 0.298 0.317***
W/o univ. grad. 0.839 0.946*** 8.381 10.082*** 0.263 0.307***
W/ univ. grad. in rel. field 0.890 0.977*** 8.098 10.265*** 0.296 0.319**
W/o univ. grad. in rel. field 0.849 0.950*** 8.356 10.156*** 0.267 0.308***
W/ univ. grad. in knowl.–intens. sectors 0.885 0.976*** 7.407 9.197*** 0.295 0.303
W/o univ. grad. in knowl.–intens. sectors 0.851 0.951*** 8.387 10.272*** 0.268 0.310***
Table 2 displays our heterogeneity measures for education, previous wages and age in the year the startup was founded. It contrasts
observed heterogeneity with our benchmark, heterogeneity under random assignment. The asteriks “***”, “**” and “*” indicate if the
observed heterogeneity is statistically significantly different from the benchmark at the one, five and ten percent marginal significance
level.
Table 3: Differences in heterogeneity between knowledge–based and non–knowledge–based firms in
the startup year
Teamsize of two
Firms in knowledge– Firms in non–knowledge– Pearson’s χ2(1) t-value p-value
intensive sectors intensive sectors
Education Blau-Index = 0 0.153 0.212 1.392 0.238
Blau-Index = 1 0.847 0.787
Age Standard deviation 7.267 7.533 -0.325 0.745
Wages Standard deviation 0.273 0.249 0.866 0.387
Firms w/ university Firms w/o university Pearson’s χ2(1) t-value p-value
graduates graduates
Education Blau-Index = 0 0.105 0.165 2.054 0.152
Blau-Index = 1 0.895 0.835
Age Standard deviation 6.898 7.555 -0.866 0.807
Wages Standard deviation 0.296 0.245 1.938 0.053
Firms w/ university Firms w/o university Pearson’s χ2(1) t-value p-value
graduates in graduates in
relevant fields relevant fields
Education Blau-Index = 0 0.162 0.156 0.008 0.928
Blau-Index = 1 0.838 0.843
Age Standard deviation 7.071 7.490 -0.378 0.647
Wages Standard deviation 0.272 0.250 0.579 0.563
Firms w/ university Firms w/o university Pearson’s χ2(1) t-value p-value
graduates in graduates in
knowl.-intens. sectors knowl.-intens. sectors
Education Blau-Index = 0 0.135 0.158 0.141 0.708
Blau-Index = 1 0.865 0.842
Age Standard deviation 6.937 7.499 -0.506 0.613
Wages Standard deviation 0.298 0.249 1.324 0.186
Teamsize larger than three
Firms in knowledge– Firms in non–knowledge– Pearson’s χ2(1) t-value p-value
intensive sectors intensive sectors
Education Blau-Index 0.843 0.870 -1.324 0.186
Age Standard deviation 8.567 9.823 -2.086 0.037
Wages Standard deviation 0.308 0.302 -0.329 0.742
Firms w/ university Firms w/o university t-value p-value
graduates graduates
Education Blau-Index 0.910 0.850 4.105 0.000
Age Standard deviation 8.894 9.821 -2.224 0.027
Wages Standard deviation 0.308 0.293 1.176 0.240
Firms w/ university Firms w/o university t-value p-value
graduates in graduates in
relevant fields relevant fields
Education Blau-Index 0.905 0.858 2.433 0.015
Age Standard deviation 8.946 9.714 -1.365 0.173
Wages Standard deviation 0.309 0.296 0.779 0.437
Firms w/ university Firms w/o university t-value p-value
graduates in graduates in
knowl.-intens. sectors knowl.-intens. sectors
Education Blau-Index 0.886 0.864 0.911 0.363
Age Standard deviation 7.793 9.730 -2.859 0.004
Wages Standard deviation 0.305 0.296 0.415 0.678
Table 3 displays tests for statistically significant differences in founder heterogeneity between knowledge–based firms and other
firms. It differentiates between firms with two and more than three founders. Our heterogeneity measure for education can only
take on the values 0 or 1/2 for teams of size two which is why we apply Pearson χ2 tests here. The p–values refer to two–sided
tests for identity of the respective heterogeneity measures for knowledge–based and non–knowledge based startups.
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Table 5: Differences in the changes in team heterogeneity due to new individuals entering the
firm between knowledge–based and non–knowledge–based startups
Firms in knowledge– Firms in non–knowledge– t-value p-value
intensive sectors intensive sectors
∆Blau-Index (mean) 0.302 0.292 1.924 0.054
∆Standard deviation of age (mean) 2.457 2.588 -0.505 0.614
∆Standard deviation of wages (mean) 0.129 0.099 3.201 0.001
Firms w/ university Firms w/o university t-value p-value
graduates graduates
∆ Blau-Index (mean) 0.170 0.292 -6.511 0.000
∆Standard deviation of age (mean) 1.769 2.803 -4.637 0.000
∆Standard deviation of wages (mean) 0.075 0.110 -4.085 0.000
Firms w/ university Firms w/o university t-value p-value
graduates in graduates in
relevant fields relevant fields
∆Blau-Index (mean) 0.174 0.281 -4.026 0.000
∆Standard deviation of age (mean) 1.893 2.704 2.573 0.010
∆Standard deviation of wages (mean) 0.071 0.106 -2.955 0.003
Firms w/ university Firms w/o university t-value p-value
graduates in graduates in
knowl.-intens. sectors knowl.-intens. sectors
∆Blau-Index (mean) 0.197 0.276 -2.668 0.008
∆Standard deviation of age (mean) 1.950 2.675 -2.050 0.040
∆Standard deviation of wages (mean) 0.086 0.105 -1.412 0.158
Table 5 displays tests for statistically significant differences in the changes in founder heterogeneity between
knowledge–based firms and other firms. The p–values refer to two–sided tests for identity of the respective het-
erogeneity measures for knowledge–based and non–knowledge–based startups.
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Appendix: Definition of knowledge based industries
Sector NACE revision 1
Knowledge–intensive sectors
1 High-tech manufacturing 23.30, 22.33, 24.11, 24.12, 24.13, 24.14, 24.17, 24.20, 24.30,
24.41, 24.42, 24.61, 24.62, 24.63, 24.64, 24.66, 29.11, 29.12,
29.13, 29.14, 29.31, 29.32, 29.40, 29.52, 29.53, 29.54, 29.55,
29.56, 29.60, 30.01, 30.02, 31.10, 31.40, 31.50, 31.62, 32.10,
32.20, 33.20, 32.30, 33.10, 33.30, 33.40, 34.10, 34.30, 35.20,
35.30
2 Technology-intensive services 64.2, 72, 73.1, 74.2, 74.3
3 Knowledge-intensive services 73.2, 74.11-74.14, 74.4
Non–knowledge–intensive sectors
4 Non-high-tech manufacturing 15-37 (without sector 1)
5 Other business oriented services 60.3, 61, 62, 63.1, 63.2, 63.4, 64.1, 71.1-71.3, 74.5-74.8, 90
6 Consumer-oriented services 55, 60.1, 60.2, 63.3, 70, 71.4, 80.4, 85, 92-93
7 Construction 45
8 Wholesale and retail trade 50-52
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